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Europe is built on debt. Credit and debt integrate societies, both within and across national 
borders. Debt relations are constitutive of the European polity, and critical for its success or 
failure.1 In this sense, the European Union has long been not only a ‘community of fate’ and 
a ‘community of law’, but also a ‘community of debt’ in which manifold bonds connect states 
and peoples. Solidarity between Member States as well as their citizenries has been one of the 
major inspirations of the European project. The recent financial crisis has put this solidarity 
to the test, raising difficult questions about who owes what to whom in today’s Europe. 
 
The aim of this special issue is to unravel the European community of debt by retracing the 
processes through which debt and solidarity have become transnationalised and 
Europeanised.2 Putting European law in its context, which is the mission of this journal,3 we 
seek to illuminate legal, economic, political, historical and cultural aspects of existing 
                                                     
1 K. Dyson, States, Debt, and Power: ‘Saints’ and ‘Sinners’ in European History and Integration (Oxford 
University Press, 2014). While Dyson’s book focuses on public debt, it also makes clear that the prevalence of 
public debt, understood as sovereign debt (in the narrow sense) or as the balance of liabilities and assets of the 
public sector (in the broader sense), is affected, and may eventually be driven, by the financial commitments of 
the private sector, including corporations as well as households, within the domestic context as well as in the 
cross-border context of capital mobility and financial integration; see ibid., at 50-52. 
2 This special issue draws on contributions to the Special Issue Workshop of the European Law Journal 
‘Community of Debt? The Transnationalisation of Debt and Solidarity in Europe’, which was held at the 
European University Institute (EUI), Florence, 19-20 November 2015. We gratefully acknowledge financial 
support by Wiley Blackwell in preparing this special issue and exceptional commitment by the editor of this 
journal to make it as informative and inspiring as possible. The workshop was organised by the research project 
‘European Bonds: The Moral Economy of Debt’ (2013-17), which receives funding from the Academy of 
Finland and the University of Helsinki. It was hosted by the European Research Council project ‘European 
Regulatory Private Law’ (2011-15) at the EUI, which was funded under the European Union’s Seventh 
Framework Programme (FP/2007–2013)/ERC Grant Agreement n [269722], and also supported by the Finnish 
Academy project ‘The Many Constitutions of Europe’ (2010-15). We would like to thank all contributors, 
commentators, and chairs for their valuable inputs to this workshop and for engaging in a very productive 
interdisciplinary discussion. Special thanks go to Agustín Menéndez, Hans Micklitz, and Kaarlo Tuori. 
3 F. Snyder, ‘Editorial’, (1995) 1 European Law Journal, 1-4. 
 
 
2 
networks of debt and solidarity, which have brought Member States, market participants, and 
European citizens closer to each other but also increased the potential for conflicts and crises. 
In turn, the Eurozone crisis offers an entry point into studying the multifaceted bonds of 
obligation, which condition and shape the European polity, and whose nature and extent has 
now become a matter of contestation. This special issue thus also contributes to 
contextualising the ongoing crisis and exploring its normative implications, which has been a 
particular interest of this journal.4 To get a grasp of the overall constitution of the European 
community of debt, we will start from its key constituents: 1) integrated capital markets,5 2) 
interdependent welfare states,6 and 3) the reformed monetary union.7 
 
The proliferation of transnational debt relations within and beyond Europe is the result of 
processes of financial and monetary integration by means of law and governance. The major 
turning point in this process was the liberalisation of capital movements, which 
complemented the free movement of goods and services, labour and enterprise, and changed 
the conditions for coordination of monetary policies on the European level. It thus had an 
effect on both ‘layers’ of the European economic constitution.8 While the microeconomic 
                                                     
4 See, for example, I. Bantekas and V. Renaud, ‘On the Odiousness of Greek Debt’, (2016) 22 European Law 
Journal, 539-565; D. Adamski, ‘Economic Policy Coordination as a Game Involving Economic Stability and 
National Sovereignty’, (2016) 22 European Law Journal, 180-203; U. Šadl and M. R. Madsen, ‘Did the 
Financial Crisis Change European Citizenship Law? An Analysis of Citizenship Rights Adjudication Before and 
After the Financial Crisis’ (2016) 22 European Law Journal, 40–60, A. Johnston, ‘Regulating Hedge Funds for 
Systemic Stability: The EU’s Approach’, (2015) 21 European Law Journal, 758-786; N. Dorn, ‘Legal 
“Elasticity” and “Sidestepping” in European Crisis Management of Financial Markets’, (2015) 21 European 
Law Journal, 787-802; F. W. Scharpf, ‘After the Crash: A Perspective on Multilevel European Democracy’, 
(2015) 21 European Law Journal, 384-405; M. A. Wilkinson, ‘Authoritarian Liberalism in the European 
Constitutional Imagination: Second Time as Farce?’, (2015) 21 European Law Journal, 313-339; A. Somek, 
‘Delegation and Authority: Authoritarian Liberalism Today’, (2015) 21 European Law Journal, 340-360; D. 
Wilsher, ‘Law and the Financial Crisis: Searching for Europe’s New Gold Standard’, (2014) 20 European Law 
Journal, 241-283; A. J. Menéndez, ‘Editorial: A European Union in Constitutional Mutation?’, (2014) 20 
European Law Journal, 127-141; C. Offe, ‘Europe Entrapped’, (2013) 19 European Law Journal, 595-611; N. 
Scicluna, ‘EU Constitutionalism in Flux: Is the Eurozone Crisis Precipitating Centralisation or Diffusion?’, 
(2012) 18 European Law Journal, 489-503; R. Colliat, ‘A Critical Genealogy of European Macroeconomic 
Governance’, (2012) 18 European Law Journal 6-23; S. Pagliari, ‘Who Governs Finance? The Shifting Public–
Private Divide in the Regulation of Derivatives, Rating Agencies and Hedge Funds’, (2012) 18 European Law 
Journal, 44-61; P. D. Amri and B. M. Kocher, ‘The Political Economy of Financial Sector Supervision and 
Banking Crises: A Cross-Country Analysis’, (2012) 18 European Law Journal, 24-43; and M. Ojo, ‘The 
Changing Role of Central Banks and the Role of Competition in Financial Regulation during (and in the 
Aftermath of) the Financial Crisis’, (2011) 17 European Law Journal, 513-533. 
5 J. Snell, ‘Free Movement of Capital: Evolution as a Non-Linear Process’, in P. Craig and G. de Búrca (eds.), 
The Evolution of EU Law (Oxford University Press, 2nd edn, 2011), 547-574. 
6 Cf. D. M. Trubek and L. G. Trubek, ‘Hard and Soft Law in the Construction of Social Europe: The Role of the 
Open Method of Co-ordination’, (2005) 11 European Law Journal, 343-364, at 345-346. 
7 Cf. F. Scharpf, ‘Monetary Union, Fiscal Crisis and the Preemption of Democracy’, (2011) MPIfG Discussion 
Paper 11/11, available at: http://www.mpifg.de/pu/mpifg_dp/dp11-11.pdf, at 34. 
8 For the distinction between micro- and macroeconomic layers of the European economic constitution, see K. 
Tuori and K. Tuori, The Eurozone Crisis: A Constitutional Analysis (Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
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constitution of the internal market came to spur the transnationalisation of private debt, the 
macroeconomic constitution was set for monetary union, which furthered the 
transnationalisation of public debt. 
 
At the same time, national welfare regimes became increasingly interlinked, although less so 
by way of building a ‘European welfare state’ through EU level social policies than through 
developments both in the micro- and macroeconomic constitution.9 Whereas the free 
movement of capital and establishment affects the capacity of Member States to raise taxes 
(tax base mobility), the right to free movement for workers and persons is increasingly being 
discussed in its effects on public spending (welfare migration). At the same time, Member 
State budgets are restricted by the requirements of monetary union, coordination of economic 
policies, and ensuing pressures towards fiscal consolidation and structural adjustment. 
 
This introduction is structured as follows: Section I outlines the conceptual framework of the 
special issue, which puts relations of debt and solidarity into a sociological perspective, 
linking law with morality and considering the political, economic, historical and cultural 
context of the distribution of rights, risks, and responsibilities. Section II focuses on the 
historical background of the European community of debt, explaining how it came into being 
through processes of financial and monetary integration, which were facilitated by changes in 
the international economic order. The liberalisation of capital movements is identified as a 
key turning point in the integration process. Sections III to V each contain a closer analysis of 
institutional preconditions and developments in the different spheres constituting the 
European community of debt: integrated capital markets, which are discussed in terms of the 
transnationalisation of private debt (Section III); interdependent welfare states, which are 
addressed in terms of the transnationalisation of solidarity (Section IV); and the reformed 
monetary union, which is analysed in terms of the transnationalisation of public debt (Section 
V). Moreover, Sections III to IV also contextualise and summarise the individual articles 
which are included in this special issue and which will turn in much more detail to specific 
constellations of debt and solidarity in the European context. Section VI contains a tentative 
synthesis of how relations of debt and solidarity are linked across the different spheres, and 
how the respective rationales of distributing rights, risks, and responsibilities between 
                                                     
9 C. Hay and D. Wincott, The Political Economy of European Welfare Capitalism (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 
at 132-133. 
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Member States, market participants, and European citizens may interact, to further illuminate 
the make-up of the European community of debt. 
 
 
I. Conceptual framework: Debt and solidarity in socio-legal perspective 
 
Focusing on the European community of debt, this special issue starts from a conceptual 
framework that accommodates legal, economic, political, historical and cultural perspectives. 
Emphasis is put on the role of law in creating, shaping, and institutionalising transnational 
debt relations and communities of solidarity. 
 
We understand debt and solidarity as phenomena that assume legal form but rest on moral 
foundations. Moreover, from a sociological point of view, debt and solidarity are social 
institutions that develop over time, reflecting changes in the societies whose needs they serve. 
In modern market economies, relations of debt and solidarity take a different (legal) form and 
fulfil a different (economic) function than in the ‘moral economies’ of other times and 
places.10 In traditional economies, such as in feudal times, social insurance was a matter of 
localised debt relations, that is, a personalised network of rights and duties.11 In industrial 
societies, social insurance is organised on the national level and ‘no longer seen as a matter of 
local reciprocity but as right of citizenship’.12 Debt and solidarity have become more abstract 
and impersonalised, and are typically mediated by positive law. In the combination of 
modern market economies with national welfare states,13 debt furthers capitalist investment 
and consumption, and solidarity secures, first of all, the commitment of workers.14 But even 
though the most advanced (or most affluent) Western societies of today share the institutional 
                                                     
10 For the distinction between the ‘old moral economy of provision’ and the ‘new political economy of the free 
market’, see E. P. Thompson, ‘The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century’ (1971) 50 
Past & Present 76-136, at 136. On the development and uses of the concept of ‘moral economy’, see C. Hann, 
‘Moral Economy’ in K. Hart, J.-L. Laville and A. D. Cattani, (eds.) The Human Economy (Polity Press, 2007), 
187-196; D. Fassin, ‘Les économies morales revisitées’, (2009) 6 Annales Histoire, Sciences Sociales, 1237-
1266; and A. Sayer, ‘Moral Economy as Critique’, (2007) 12 New Political Economy, 261-270. 
11 L. Fontaine, L’économie morale: Pauvreté, crédit et confiance dans l’Europe préindustrielle (Gallimard, 
2008). 
12 J. C. Scott, ‘Afterword to “Moral Economies, State Spaces, and Categorical Violence”’, (2005) 107 American 
Anthropologist, 395-402, at 397. 
13 Also dubbed ‘moral-economy state’; ibid. 
14 Cf. C. Crouch, ‘Beyond the Flexibility/Security Trade-Off: Reconciling Confident Consumers with Insecure 
Workers’, 50 British Journal of Industrial Relations, 1-22. 
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underpinnings of modern welfare capitalism,15 there is also some variation as to how the 
rights and obligations inherent in the ‘bonds’ of debt and solidarity are defined and 
distributed, both between countries and over time. 
 
The overall framing of this special issue is inspired by a classical sociological method: using 
law as an indicator of morality, which reflects the division of labour in society, that is, a 
certain state of socio-economic development.16 In modern society, law renders visible the 
(hidden) bonds of obligation in what have become extended and abstract networks of 
exchange, reciprocity, and redistribution. Our particular interest is in European (Union) law, 
which can be understood as the institutional backbone of a European society in the making, 
and our specific focus is on the transnationalisation of debt and solidarity, which holds this 
society together but which may also tear it apart. 
 
More specifically, our conceptual framework draws on the economic sociology of law, which 
deals with the interconnections between law, economy, and society.17 In capitalist societies, 
market exchange plays a pre-eminent role, which has led some scholars to speak of a ‘market 
society’.18 Turning to the law, one can claim that law ‘constitutes’ the market society.19 
Modern markets rest on ‘dogmatic foundations’: private property, free contract, and legal 
personhood, which are all ‘legal fictions’, as are the ‘fictitious commodities’ of land, labour, 
and money (or capital), the main production factors of capitalist enterprise.20 In this special 
issue, our main concern is with the role of the law in both in the commodification of debt and 
in the institutionalisation of solidarity in a European society in the making, which we 
consider a prototype of a transnational market society. 
                                                     
15 C. Pierson, ‘Welfare Capitalism’, in T. Fitzpatrick, H. Kwon, N. Manning, J. Midgley and G. Pacall (eds.), 
International Encyclopedia of Social Policy (Routledge, 2010), 1518-1523. 
16 E. Durkheim, The Division of Labour in Society, translated by W. D. Halls (Macmillan, 1984, first published 
in 1893). 
17 R. Swedberg, ‘The Case for an Economic Sociology of Law’ (2003) 32 Theory and Society, 1-37; and D. 
Ashiagbor, P. Kotiswaran, and A. Perry-Kessaris (eds.), ‘Special Issue: Towards an Economic Sociology of 
Law’, (2013) 40 Journal of Law and Society, 1-171. 
18 In a market society, the institution of markets dominates ‘the whole organization of society, [which] means no 
less than the running of society as an adjunct to the market’; K. Polanyi, The Great Transformation (Beacon 
Press, 1944), at 57. 
19 S. Frerichs, What Constitutes the Market Society? Studies in the Economic Sociology of Law. Postdoctoral 
‘habilitation’ thesis (University of Bamberg, Bamberg, 2012); and S. Frerichs, ‘The Law of Market Society: A 
Sociology of International Economic Law and Beyond’, (2016) 23 Finnish Yearbook of International Law 173-
237. 
20 A. Supiot, Homo Juridicus: On the Anthropological Function of the Law (Verso, 2007), at 94; cf. E. 
Pashukanis, ‘The General Theory of Law and Marxism’, in P. Beirne and R. Sharlet (eds.) Pashukanis: Selected 
Writings on Marxism and Law (Academic Press, 1980, first published in 1924), 40-131; Polanyi, above, n. 18, at 
68-76. 
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Debt relations are ubiquitous, and were so already in pre-capitalist times.21 The moral and 
legal relevance of debt relations can be seen in the distribution of rights, risks, and 
responsibilities between creditors and debtors. Throughout history, debtors have defended 
their rights and livelihoods in the form of debt riots, which are, of course, a rather 
extraordinary means to redress the balance between creditors and debtors.22 In ordinary times, 
debt default is regulated by law (private or public), which ideally institutionalises the 
prevailing morality. Schematically, one can distinguish between two opposed normative 
principles marking the poles of creditor protection (caveat debitor: let the debtor beware) and 
debtor protection (caveat creditor: let the creditor beware). In the market society, debt has 
become an objective legal relation and a tradeable economic commodity.23 In its 
commodified form, debt circulates in networks of market exchange and may easily cross 
borders.24 Whereas the commodification and securitisation of debt fulfils an important 
function in contemporary capitalist societies, it can also be taken too far, as shown by the 
‘excesses of financialisation’, which triggered the recent financial crisis. 
 
Etymologically, the origin of the notion of solidarity is likewise a debt relation. In Roman 
law, the Latin term solidum referred to ‘[a] thing in its entirety, a whole, a sum due as a 
whole’.25 In turn, in solidum obligare refers to a relation of joint and several liability of two 
or more debtors vis-à-vis their creditor: ‘Each of several joint-debtors may be compelled to 
pay the whole or any part of the debt. The creditor may sue any one of the joint-debtors for 
the whole or any part of the debt […]; but he cannot be compelled so to divide his claim, 
even if all the joint-debtors are solvent.’26 This legal construct of solidarity is still preserved 
in the French notions of solidité and solidarité of the mid-eighteenth century; and it is only 
                                                     
21 D. Graeber, Debt: The First 5000 Years (Melville House, 2011); Fontaine, above, n. 11. 
22 Graeber, above, n. 21, at 8. 
23 Cf. S. Frerichs, ‘From Credit to Crisis: Max Weber, Karl Polanyi, and the Other Side of the Coin’, (2013) 40 
Journal of Law and Society, 7-26; S. Frerichs, ‘Money Matters: The Heads and Tails of Conflicts-Law 
Constitutionalism’, in C. Joerges and C. Glinski (eds.) The European Crisis and the Transformation of 
Transnational Governance: Authoritarian Managerialism vs Democratic Governance (Hart Publishing, 2014), 
1-19. 
24 Juutilainen, this issue. 
25 A. Berger, Encyclopedic Dictionary of Roman Law (The Lawbook Exchange, 2004, first published in 1953), 
at 710. 
26 W. A. Hunter, A Systematic and Historical Exposition of Roman Law in the Order of a Code (William 
Maxwell & Son, 2nd edn, 1885), available at: 
https://archive.org/download/asystematicandh00crosgoog/asystematicandh00crosgoog.pdf, at 555. 
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after the French revolution, that the term solidarity was given a new, political meaning.27 
Today, it can be discussed whether solidarity indeed requires a relatively ‘solid’ social 
collective, as in national welfare states,28 or whether it can also take the more flexible 
character of a transnational ‘network solidarity with open ends’.29 The question whether 
mutual liability should exist within the European community of debt or limited liability of 
creditor states with regard to debtor states was and is highly controversial.30 
 
 
II. Historical background: European financial and monetary integration 
 
In this special issue, we focus on the transnational network of debt relations and 
commitments of solidarity arising out of the European economic constitution: the legal and 
constitutional framework of the European integration process, whose core project has always 
been economic integration. Tuori and Tuori distinguish between ‘the microeconomic 
constitution, centred around free movement and competition law and introduced by the 
Treaty of Rome (1958), and the macroeconomic constitution, centred around aggregate 
economic objectives and economic policies, and introduced by the Treaty of Maastricht 
(1993)’.31 Even though we lay emphasis on the economic, and not the political, constitution, 
we do not mean to put forward an ordoliberal reading of the integration project. While 
ordoliberalism did have a formative influence on its development, the European economic 
constitution is fraught with tensions, allows for different readings, and remains subject to 
contestation.32 
 
                                                     
27 A. Wildt, ‘Solidarity: Its History and Contemporary Definition’, in K. Bayertz, Kurt (ed.) Solidarity (Kluwer 
Academic Publishers: 1999), 209-220, at 210. 
28 Ferrera, this issue. 
29 R. Münch and S. Büttner, ‘Die europäische Teilung der Arbeit: Was können wir von Emile Durkheim 
lernen?’, in M. Heidenreich, Martin (ed.): Die Europäisierung sozialer Ungleichheit: Zur transnationalen 
Klassen- und Sozialstrukturanalyse (Campus, 2006), 65-107, at 74 (my translation); see also R. Münch, 
‘Constructing a European Society by Jurisdiction’, European Law Journal (2008) 14, 519-541, at 521; cf. S. 
Frerichs, ‘Transformation der Solidarität’, in M. Bach and B. Hönig (eds.) Europasoziologie: Handbuch für 
Wissenschaft und Studium (Nomos, forthcoming). 
30 Dyson, above, n. 1, at 584-585. Dyson frames this as a problem of matching liability and control and aligning 
rights and responsibilities; ibid., at 240. 
31  Tuori and Tuori, above, n. 8, at xii; for a critical review, see C. Joerges, ‘“Brother, Can You 
Paradigm”’, (2014) 12 International Journal of Constitutional Law, 769-785, at 772-775. 
32 See, for a classic piece on the microeconomic constitution, M. Poiares Maduro, We The Court: The European 
Court of Justice and the European Economic Constitution – A Critical Reading of Article 30 of the EC Treaty 
(Hart Publishing, 1998) and, for a more recent comment on the macroeconomic constitution, C. Joerges, 
‘Europe’s Economic Constitution in Crisis and the Emergence of a New Constitutional Constellation’, (2014) 
15 German Law Journal, 985-1027. 
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On the most general level, our claim is that the European economic constitution has acted as 
a catalyst of the transnationalisation of debt and solidarity around the projects of the internal 
market and monetary union. To simplify, we will speak of the microeconomic constitution of 
the internal market and the macroeconomic constitution of monetary union. While the recent 
crisis brought the macroeconomic constitution to the fore, the integration process was long 
dominated by the microeconomic constitution. It would be more precise to say, though, that 
the integration process rested, at its outset, on a different macroeconomic constitution, which 
was not fully ‘Europeanised’.33 Again, the turning point can be seen in the liberalisation of 
capital movements. 
 
To lay the ground for the following sections, which specify the analytical framework of this 
special issue and contextualise the individual contributions, it is worthwhile to briefly recap 
the processes of financial and monetary integration that furthered the transnationalisation of 
private and public debt and put constraints on national economic and social policies. This 
requires, first, defining what we mean by financial and monetary integration. Financial 
integration refers, according to a common textbook, to the integration of financial markets by 
furthering the free movement of capital, including money and financial capital as well as 
direct investments, and the free movement of financial services, including banking, insurance 
and investment services.34 By monetary integration, we refer to the integration of monetary 
policies and the introduction of the euro, which is premised on close coordination of national 
fiscal and economic policies. Our intention is not to exclusively focus on financial and/or 
monetary integration, but to emphasise the links between them and their implications for the 
European polity as a whole. 
 
The Treaty of Rome, the founding document of the European Economic Community (EEC), 
was lacking a distinctive monetary constitution, albeit it did aim for balanced trade, which 
has implications for the balance of payments. Formally, the provision of monetary stability 
was left to the Member States and macroeconomic coordination was largely voluntary: ‘[t]he 
most far-going Community competences concerned Member States’ exchange-rate policy 
                                                     
33 Combining internal and external elements: the European Payments Union, and later the European Monetary 
Agreement, on the one hand, and the system of Bretton Woods on the other. For more on the latter, see below. 
34 J. Pelkmans, European Integration: Methods and Economic Analysis (Prentice Hall, 2nd edn, 2001), at 125 
and 162. 
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and their balance of payments’, which were considered matters of ‘common concern’.35 Most 
importantly, however, economic integration initially proceeded under the premise of the fixed 
exchange-rate system of Bretton Woods, which was introduced after the Second World War 
and remained in place until the early 1970s. Hence, one could say that the international 
currency system supplemented the European economic constitution in its external, 
macroeconomic dimension. 
 
At the same time, the free movement of capital was only ‘depicted as an aspirational goal’ in 
the Treaty of Rome, with the assumption being that attainment of this goal was premised on 
political integration.36 In practice, for the first few decades of the integration process, capital 
mobility remained accessory to the other economic freedoms: the free movement of goods, 
services, and workers. Under conditions of limited capital mobility, Member States could 
engage in macroeconomic steering without fearing sanctions by ‘volatile’ financial markets, 
such as capital flight or speculation. To put it differently, the role of international finance was 
still contained.37 
 
This changed, most visibly, with the exponential growth of the so-called Euromarkets in the 
1960s and 1970s: ‘offshore’ markets for US dollars. Under the gold-dollar exchange standard 
of Bretton Woods, the US dollar had become the world’s main reserve currency. This 
increased the demand for US dollar deposits outside the United States, which was first 
satisfied by banks in the City of London, under permissive regulatory conditions. The 
increasing scope of transactions in the Euromarkets, which were not restricted to Europe, nor 
to transactions in US dollars, undermined the control, or management, of exchange rates by 
national central banks and thus ‘undoubtedly represented one nail in the coffin of the Bretton 
Woods fixed-exchange-rate scheme’.38 However, it has also been argued that the inherent 
shortcomings of the gold-dollar exchange standard made its collapse ‘predictable’, as it 
‘relieved in fact – even though not in law’ the USA from having to adjust its own balance of 
payments.39 
                                                     
35 Tuori and Tuori, above, n. 8, at 20; cf. Art. 107 of the Treaty establishing the European Economic 
Community, signed on 25 March 1957. 
36 A. J. Menéndez, ‘The Existential Crisis of the European Union’, (2013) 14 German Law Journal, 453-526, at 
474. 
37 E. Helleiner, States and the Reemergence of Global Finance: From Bretton Woods to the 1990s (Cornell 
University Press, 1994). 
38 P.-C. Hautcoeur, ‘Financial Markets / Euromarkets’, in A. Iriye and P.-Y. Saunier (eds.), The Palgrave 
Dictionary of Transnational History (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 408-412, at 412. 
39 R. Triffin, ‘“Europe and the Money Muddle” Revisited’, (1978) 31 PSL Quarterly Review, 49-65, at 53-54. 
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With the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, the deregulation of finance, which is, 
properly speaking, a move towards ‘market-conforming regulation’, gained momentum: it 
‘accelerated in the 1970s and became the norm in the 1980s’.40 This is most evident in the 
liberalisation of capital movements, which was first advanced on the unilateral level by EEC 
member states such as Germany (1961), the United Kingdom (1979), and the Benelux 
countries (1980; between each other). In the wake of the Single European Act (1987) the free 
movement of capital was put on an equal footing with the other economic freedoms.41 
Directive 88/361 projected a fully liberalised European capital market by 1992.42 
Importantly, this included an erga omnes extension of capital mobility with regard to third 
countries, which meant that ‘European financial integration would imply the embrace of 
global capital flows’.43 In the Treaty of Maastricht, the free movement of capital was finally 
constitutionalised and given direct effect.44 
 
After the end of Bretton Woods, efforts focused on creating a similar monetary system on the 
European level to provide for exchange-rate stability. In the 1970s, some countries 
experimented with the European ‘currency snake’.45 In 1979, the European Monetary System 
(EMS) was established.46 Both initiatives were taken outside the Treaty framework. 
However, the ‘impossible trinity’ of full capital mobility, fixed exchange rates and 
autonomous monetary policy seemed to force the Member States to move towards a fully-
fledged economic and monetary union.47 In fact, the EMS was exposed to speculative attacks 
                                                     
40 C. Lapavitsas, Profiting Without Producing: How Finance Exploits Us All (Verso, 2013), at 311-312. 
41 See Art. 13 of the Single European Act, signed on 17 and 28 February 1986. 
42 See Art. 1 of Council Directive of 24 June 1988 for the implementation of Article 67 of the Treaty 
(88/361/EEC) OJ L 178, 8 July 1988, 5-18. 
43 R. Abdelal, ‘Writing the Rules of Global Finance: France, Europe, and Capital Liberalization’, (2006) 13 
Review of International Political Economy, 1-27, at 11. 
44 See Art. 73 of the Treaty on European Union, signed on 7 February 1992. Now Art. 63 TFEU. 
45 Agreement between the central banks of the Member States of the Community on the narrowing of the 
margins of fluctuation between the currencies of the European Economic Community, Basle, 10 April 1972. 
Other European countries joined. Cf. H. James, Making the European Monetary Union (Princeton University 
Press, 2012), at 101-102. 
46 Agreement between the central banks of the Member States of the European Economic Community laying 
down the operating procedures of the European Monetary System, Basle, 13 March 1979. Cf. James, above, n. 
45, at 178-179. 
47 R. A. Mundell, ‘Capital Mobility and Stabilization Policy under Fixed and Flexible Exchange Rates’, (1963) 
29 Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, 475-485; cf. P. Krugman, ‘O Canada: A Neglected 
Nation Gets Its Nobel’, Slate Magazine, 19 October 1999, available at: 
http://www.slate.com/articles/business/the_dismal_science/1999/10/o_canada.html. 
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and ran into terminal crisis in 1992, shortly before the Maastricht Treaty entered into force.48 
Under the premise of the free movement of capital, financial integration thus entailed 
monetary integration. 
 
 
III. Integrated capital markets: Transnationalisation of private debt 
 
With the liberalisation of capital movements, the integration process changed its logic. 
Financial integration within the EEC and with regard to third countries got intertwined with 
the globalisation of financial markets, the re-emergence of international finance, and the 
financialisation of capitalism.49 Financialisation here refers not only to the availability of new 
financial technologies (or the creation of ‘synthetic’ financial products on the basis of more 
conventional debt relations) but, more generally, to a ‘transformation of advanced capitalist 
economies’ in the course of which banks, non-financial enterprises, and households have 
become increasingly involved in the logic of finance.50 The nexus between the European 
economic constitution and the regime of financialised capitalism, which emerged in the 
Anglo-Saxon world (first of all in the USA and the UK), but which also implicated countries 
in continental Europe,51 became evident in the recent crisis, which has been interpreted as a 
‘crisis of financialisation’.52 However, the normative framework, on which this regime rests, 
was also made in Europe.53 In the light of the constitutive role of the EU in ‘juridifying’ the 
free movement of capital, Menéndez even suggests that ‘[w]hile the driving economic forces 
in the process of financialization had been US financial institutions, the driving legal force 
was the European Union’.54 
 
                                                     
48 James, above, n. 45, 324-381; A. Harmes, ‘Institutional Investors and Polanyi’s Double Movement: A Model 
of Contemporary Currency Crises’, (2001) 8 Review of International Political Economy, 389-437, at 412-417. 
49 C. Sifakis-Kapetanakis, ‘The European Monetary Integration Process and Financial Globalization: The 
Rationale of the “Creative Imbalance” Model’, (2007) 36 International Journal of Political Economy, 75-90, at 
83. 
50 Banks have turned from relationship-banking to investment banking practices, non-financial enterprises have 
increased their activities in financial markets, and private households have started to accrue more financial 
liabilities and assets; Lapavitsas, above, n. 40, at 15; cf. M. Sawyer, ‘What Is Financialization?’, (2013) 42:4 
(Winter) International Journal of Political Economy, 5-18. 
51 R. Bellofiore, ‘Two Or Three Things I Know About Her’: Europe in the Global Crisis and Heterodox 
Economics, (2013) 37 Cambridge Journal of Economics 497-512, at 505-506. 
52 Lapavitsas, above, n. 40. 
53 Abdelal, above, n. 43. 
54 Menéndez, above, n. 36, 489. 
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This section starts from the fact that the present European crisis was triggered by a financial 
crisis, which ‘originated in private credit relations and securitisation’55 in increasingly 
integrated capital markets on the European as well as on the global level. Crouch points to 
‘the growth of credit markets for poor and middle-income people, and of derivatives and 
futures markets among the very wealthy’,56 which came to feed the ‘Anglo-liberal growth 
model’ but also left traces in other socio-economic regimes.57 Within the highly 
interdependent global financial system, the crisis travelled from continent to continent, from 
banks to states, from financial derivatives to the common currency. What began as a US 
subprime mortgage crisis turned into an EU sovereign debt crisis. Focusing on the 
transnationalisation of private debt, our aim in this section is to investigate the role of the law 
in the commodification and securitisation of private debt relations, and to explore alternative 
regulatory options against the backdrop of the recent financial crisis. 
 
Analytically speaking, the European community of debt in its ‘deepest’ layer rests on a 
network of debt relations between private actors (including business as well as consumers), 
which reaches far beyond Europe, but whose regulation is also a matter of European concern. 
The integration of capital markets is premised on ‘law-based’ commodification of debt, 
which improves the tradeability of claims across borders.58 In financialised capitalism, debt 
commodification includes the securitisation of debt through ‘objectification and abstraction 
of risk’.59 This means that the specific risk, say, of providing home mortgages to a clientele 
with little income and no assets, is ‘detached from the social context that created the risk and 
the relations in which it is immersed’ and transformed into a ‘universal type’ of risk, which 
can be priced and traded in derivatives markets without knowing, or having to know, all the 
details.60 
 
Law affects the distribution of rights and responsibilities in debt relations between private 
actors, emphasising either creditor or debtor protection. Moreover, in fulfilling its ‘social 
                                                     
55 N.-L. Sum and B. Jessop, Towards a Cultural Political Economy: Putting Culture in its Place in Political 
Economy (Edward Elgar, 2013), at 493. 
56 C. Crouch, ‘Privatised Keynesianism: An Unacknowledged Policy Regime’, (2009) 11 British Journal of 
Politics and International Relations, 382-399, at 390. 
57 C. Hay, ‘Pathology Without Crisis? The Strange Demise of the Anglo-Liberal Growth Model’ (2011) 46 
Government and Opposition, 1-31. Hay and Wincott note that there was ‘no simple one-to-one correlation 
between welfare regime cluster and growth model’; Hay and Wincott, above, n. 9, at 201. 
58 Juutilainen, this issue. 
59 E. LiPuma and B. Lee, ‘Financial Derivatives and the Rise of Circulation’ (2005) 34 Economy and Society 
404–427, at 408. 
60 Ibid., at 414. 
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function’, law also mediates between public and private interests.61 Economically speaking, 
law determines to what extent private actors may ‘externalise’ the risks and costs of a 
potential debt default. The ambiguities of this so-called ‘moral-hazard’ argument, which has 
become very prominent in public discourse, can be illustrated by contrasting the ‘too big to 
fail’ of insolvent banks with the ‘never too small to fail’62 of insolvent consumers in the 
context of the mortgage crisis in the USA but also in several states of the Eurozone, including 
Spain.63 While the question of ‘who benefits and who pays’ may be answered on the 
individual level, where a trade-off between creditors and debtors can be assumed, there is no 
easy response on the systemic level, where what is at stake is financial stability, which 
arguably benefits all. 
 
In this section, we are interested as much in the transnationalisation of debt relations as in the 
transnationalisation of the law governing debt relations.64 The latter can be illustrated by the 
development of insolvency regimes across different countries. This development reveals not 
only differences between legal cultures – with some countries consistently being pro-creditor, 
others pro-debtor in orientation – but also ‘forces of global convergence’.65 This form of 
transnationalisation can be observed in corporate insolvency regimes66 as well as in consumer 
insolvency regimes.67 Hence, while some insolvency regimes can be considered more 
                                                     
61 For the classical debate, see F. Baur, J. Esser, F. Kübler and E. Steindorff (eds.), Funktionswandel der 
Privatrechtsinstitutionen: Festschrift für Ludwig Raiser zum 70. Geburtstag (Mohr, 1974), and for more recent 
reconstructions and applications, see C Joerges, ‘The Science of Private Law and the Nation-State’, in F. Snyder 
(ed.), The Europeanisation of Law: The Legal Effects of European Integration (Hart Publishing, 2000), 47-82; 
T. Wilhelmsson, ‘Varieties of Welfarism in European Contract Law’, (2004) 10 European Law Journal, 712-
733; and R. Michaels, ‘Of Islands and the Ocean: The Two Rationalities of European Private Law’, in R. 
Brownsword, H.-W. Micklitz, L. Niglia and S. Weatherill (eds.), The Foundations of European Private Law 
(Hart Publishing, 2011), 139-158. 
62 J. Niemi, ‘Never too Small to Fail: Insolvency of Consumers as an International Concern’, in J. Niemi, S. 
Block-Lieb and W. Backert (eds.), Contemporary Issues in Consumer Bankruptcy (Peter Lang, 2013), 9-19. 
63 For the US, see A. Mian and A. Sufi, ‘The Consequences of Mortgage Credit Expansion: Evidence From the 
U.S. Mortgage Default Crisis’, (2009) 124 Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1449-1496 as well as O. Bar-Gill, 
‘The Law, Economics and Psychology of Subprime Mortgage Contracts’ (2009) 94 Cornell Law Review, 1073-
1151; for Spain, see P. Gutiérrez de Cabiedes and M. Cantero Gamito, ‘Country Report Spain’, in H.-W. 
Micklitz and I. Domurath (eds.) Consumer Debt and Social Exclusion in Europe (Routledge, 2016), 67-84. 
64 On the concept, field, and method of transnational law, see P. Zumbansen (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of 
Transnational Law (Oxford University Press, forthcoming). Cf. M. Maduro, K. Tuori and S. Sankari (eds.): 
Transnational Law: Rethinking European Law and Legal Thinking (Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
65 T. C. Halliday and B. G. Carruthers, ‘The Recursivity of Law: Global Norm Making and National 
Lawmaking in the Globalization of Corporate Insolvency Regimes’, (2007) 112 American Journal of Sociology, 
1135-1202, at 1136; cf. J.-O. Heuer, Rules and Norms of Consumer Insolvency and Debt Relief: A Comparison 
and Classification of Personal Bankruptcy Systems in 15 Economically Advanced Countries (Doctoral 
dissertation, University of Bremen, 2014), at 80-82. 
66 P. R. Wood, Principles of International Insolvency (Sweet & Maxwell, 2nd edn, 2007), at 75-78 and 87-89; 
cf. Halliday and Carruthers, above, n. 65. 
67 Heuer, above, n. 65, at 450-451; cf. World Bank, Insolvency and Creditor/Debtor Regimes Task Force, 
Report on the Treatment of the Insolvency of Natural Persons (World Bank, 2014), available at: 
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creditor-friendly than others, such as those based on the ‘English’ common-law approach as 
opposed to the ‘French’ civil-law approach, one may also see an overall trend towards more 
debtor-friendly regimes,68 which gained momentum in the course of the recent financial 
crisis.69 In the case of consumer insolvency, inspiration is drawn from the ‘US-American’ 
approach of a relatively easy debt discharge, which ‘frees the debtor from the shackles of 
existing debt and places him on the economic treadmill once again – to earn, consume and 
borrow’.70 This so-called ‘fresh start’ policy71 reflects the needs of what Ramsay describes as 
‘consumer credit capitalism’,72 which has its origins in the USA, but which is spreading on 
the European continent as well. The increase in privately-incurred debt and private insurance 
of risk is not least a result of the transformation of the welfare state, which we will turn to in 
the following section. Whereas the first contribution to this section highlights the role of law 
in the commodification of private debt, which facilitates the transnationalisation of debt 
relations, the second contribution turns to the regulation of mortgage contracts, which brings 
the social function of private law to the fore. Focusing on the European context, both articles 
contextualise recent legal developments, and explore options for law reform. 
 
[‘Law-Based Commodification of Private Debt’ (Teemu Juutilainen)] 
 
Juutilainen’s article defines the commodification of debt as a process in which debt 
transforms into a tradeable asset and acquires features of an exclusive and transferable 
property right. Law is constitutive in this process, which can be considered indispensable for 
a commercial society, but which may also lead to excessive financialisation. Against the 
backdrop of the classical understanding of debt as inalienable, the article retraces the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/17606. See also the 15th recital of the preamble of the 
Commission Recommendation on a new approach to business failure and insolvency, C(2014) 1500 final, 
12.3.2014, available at: ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/files/c_2014_1500_en.pdf. 
68 For corporate insolvency regimes, see Halliday and Carruthers, above, n. 65, at 1137 and 1161, fn. 22; for 
consumer insolvency regimes, see I. Ramsay, ‘Models of Consumer Bankruptcy: Implications for Research and 
Policy’, (1997) 20 Journal of Consumer Policy, 269-287, at 269; cf. J. Niemi-Kiesiläinen, ‘Consumer 
Bankruptcy in Comparison: Do We Cure a Market Failure or a Social Problem?’, (1999) 37 Osgoode Hall Law 
Journal, 473-503, at 482. 
69 Y. Liu and C. B. Rosenberg, ‘Dealing with Private Debt Distress in the Wake of the European Financial 
Crisis: A Review of the Economics and Legal Toolbox’, (2013) IMF Working Paper 13/44, available at: 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2013/wp1344.pdf. 
70 R. E. Flint, ‘Bankruptcy Policy: Toward a Moral Justification for Financial Rehabilitation of the Consumer 
Debtor’, (1991) 48 Washington and Lee Law Review, 515-577, at 515-516. 
71 Which was in place for more than a century but modified from an ‘unfettered’ to a ‘conditional’ discharge of 
debt in 2005; see S. Block-Lieb, ‘Austerity, Debt Overhang and the Design of International Standards on 
Sovereign, Corporate, and Consumer Debt Restructuring’, (2015) 22 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, 
487-541, at 537-537. 
72 I. Ramsay, ‘Comparative Consumer Bankruptcy’, (2007) University of Illinois Law Review, 241-273, at 248. 
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commodification of debt over two millennia: from its beginnings in ancient Roman law to the 
medieval ius commune and to modern national law. Three modes of debt commodification 
are identified, on which the transnationalisation of private debt rests: the ‘propertification’ of 
debt, the ‘impersonalisation’ of debt relations through standardisation, and processes of ‘risk 
abstraction’ enabling the securitisation of debt. While the historical account exposes the 
contingency of debt commodification, the analysis of its different modes points to the 
ambiguities of commodified debt as a legal and social institution. The analytical framework is 
applied to topical questions in the transnationalisation of private debt: cross-border 
assignment of claims and regulation of the European securitisation market. Both issues are 
taken up in the European Commission ‘Action Plan on Building a Capital Markets Union’,73 
which seeks to improve the conditions for a truly integrated capital market in the EU. As 
Juutilainen concludes, the analytics of debt commodification helps to gain a broader and 
more differentiated perspective on the risks and benefits of future law-making in these fields. 
 
[‘Mortgage Debt and the Social Function of Contract’ (Irina Domurath)] 
 
Domurath’s article deals with the legal implications of a phenomenon that feeds into the 
transnationalisation of private debt: the expansion of consumer credit and, more specifically, 
the promotion of home mortgages as a means to improve consumer welfare. The proliferation 
of consumer credit capitalism is fuelled by a transformation of the welfare state from 
providing public goods and services to facilitating their provision in private markets. Hence, 
instead of offering public housing, private home-ownership is advanced. Under these 
conditions, the social function of private law is emphasised, or the need for a fair distribution 
of rights, risks and responsibilities between (commercial) creditors and (consumer) debtors. It 
is argued that the EU has adopted the idea of financial inclusion through access to credit but 
that it has not adapted its conception of contracts accordingly. Whereas the traditional model 
of contract law is characterised by a formalistic understanding of contracts as punctual 
agreements which have to be observed as they were concluded, the cooperative model 
emphasises the relational dimension of contracts, which may allow for an adjustment of 
obligations in the case of unforeseen events. The article shows that EU mortgage law still 
adheres to a rather formalistic conception of contract law which leaves little room for 
                                                     
73 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, ‘Action Plan on Building a Capital Markets Union’, 
COM(2015) 468 final, 30 September 2015, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/finance/capital-markets-
union/docs/building-cmu-action-plan_en.pdf. 
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adaptation, and that the emphasis on procedural fairness in recent CJEU case law is likewise 
insufficient to ensure a fair allocation of (market) risks. In the recent financial crisis, this led 
to a dramatic surge in mortgage defaults and evictions. 
 
 
IV. Interdependent welfare states: Transnationalisation of solidarity 
 
In the early decades of the integration process, the European economic constitution still 
preserved the monetary autonomy of the Member States and their right to control capital 
mobility. The ‘embedded liberalism’ of the postwar era74 allowed Member States to engage 
in macroeconomic steering. This was one of the key features of the so-called ‘Keynesian 
welfare national state’, which had its heyday between the 1950s and 1970s, and whose 
overall aim was to ‘promote full employment in a relatively closed national economy 
primarily through demand-side management, and to generalize norms of mass consumption 
through welfare rights and new forms of collective consumption.’75 In broader terms, one can 
speak of ‘welfare capitalism’. This refers to a socio-economic regime that integrates the 
functions of a capitalist market economy, which builds on civil rights, namely property rights, 
with those of a democratic welfare state. This in turn lays emphasis on political and social 
rights.76 Simply put, welfare capitalism reconciles the interests of ‘capital’ and ‘labour’.77 
The institutionalisation of collective bargaining in a (state-supported) system of industrial 
relations was a response to the social question raised by the industrial revolution, the social 
repercussions of economic integration under the gold standard, and the Great Depression.78 
With the end of Bretton Woods, the liberalisation of capital movements, and the rise of global 
finance, the institutional preconditions of welfare capitalism fundamentally changed. This 
                                                     
74 J. G. Ruggie, ‘International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar 
Economic Order’, (1982) 36 International Organization, 379-415. 
75 B. Jessop, ‘Towards a Schumpeterian Workfare State? Preliminary Remarks on Post-Fordist Political 
Economy’ (1993) 40 Studies in Political Economy, 7-39, at 9. Jessop contrasts this with the aims of the 
(emerging) ‘Schumpeterian Workfare State’: ‘the promotion of product, process, organizational, and market 
innovation; the enhancement of the structural competitiveness of open economies mainly through supply-side 
intervention; and the subordination of social policy to the demands of labour market flexibility and structural 
competitiveness’; ibid. Cf. B. Jessop and N.-L. Sum, Beyond the Regulation Approach: Putting Capitalist 
Economies in their Place (Edward Elgar, 2006), at 106-107.  
76 Cf. S. Frerichs, ‘From Social Rights to Economic Incentives? The Moral (Re)construction of Welfare 
Capitalism’, in T. Kotkas and K. Veitch (eds.) Social Rights in the Welfare State: Origins and Transformations 
(Routledge, 2017), 137-156. 
77  Pierson, above, n. 15, at 1518-1519. 
78 Polanyi, above, n. 18. 
 
 
17 
does not mean that the welfare state ceased to exist,79 but it underwent deep 
transformations.80 
 
This section is concerned with the transformation of welfare capitalism in the European 
context and explores in what ways the EU is either complementing or challenging national 
welfare states. The underlying assumption is not that the transformation of welfare capitalism 
is caused by the process of European integration but that it is interrelated with that process. 
We will first give a general account of recent developments and then turn, more specifically, 
to the European context. To avoid the impression that our concern is with social spending 
only, we will speak of the transformation of the national tax state on the one hand and of the 
national welfare state on the other. These are but two sides of the same coin: the revenue side 
and the expenditure side of welfare capitalism. Debt enters the picture on both sides. On the 
revenue side, one can refer to the late 20th-century ‘fiscal crisis of the state’, which was 
‘caused less by an increase in citizen entitlements than by a general decline in the taxability 
of democratic-capitalist societies.’81 The mismatch between government revenue and 
government spending resulted in increasing public debt, which turned the tax state into a 
‘debt state’, and ultimately into a ‘consolidation state’, which seeks to solve the fiscal crisis 
‘not by raising revenue but by cutting expenditure’.82 On the expenditure side, in turn, one 
can witness a paradigmatic shift ‘from welfare to workfare’83 but also ‘from welfare to 
debtfare’.84 Formerly unconditional welfare benefits have become contingent on the 
activation of welfare recipients in the labour market. At the same time, the reduction of 
public demand and consolidation of public debt seems to be compensated at least partially by 
an increase of private debt, which includes the activation of consumers in the credit market.85 
This is referred to as ‘privatised Keynesianism’: ‘Instead of governments taking on debt to 
stimulate the economy, individuals did so.’86 The transformation of welfare capitalism is thus 
                                                     
79 D. Garland, ‘The Welfare State: A Fundamental Dimension of Modern Government’, (2014) 55 European 
Journal of Sociology, 327-364. 
80 H. Obinger and P. Starke, P. (2014) ‘Welfare State Transformation: Convergence and the Rise of the Supply 
Side Model’, (2014) TransState Working Papers No. 180, available at: http://www.sfb597.uni-
bremen.de/pages/download.php?ID=221&SPRACHE=en&TABLE=AP&TYPE=PDFZ. 
81 W. Streeck, ‘The Rise of the European Consolidation State’, (2015) MPIfG Discussion Paper 15/1, available 
at: http://www.mpifg.de/pu/mpifg_dp/dp15-1.pdf, at 4. 
82 Ibid., at 2-3 and 10. 
83 Jessop, above, n. 75; J. Peck, ‘The Rise of the Workfare State’ (2003) Kurswechsel No. 3, 75-87 
84 S. Soederberg, ‘The US Debtfare State and the Credit Card Industry: Forging Spaces of Dispossession’, 
(2013) 45 Antipode, 493-512, at 495. 
85 Frerichs, above, n. 76, at 148. 
86 Crouch, above, n. 56, at 390. 
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linked with the expansion of private debt relations, which we were concerned with in the 
previous section. 
 
Our main interest in this section is the ‘Europeanisation’ of welfare capitalism, or how the tax 
and welfare regimes of the Member States have become interlinked through processes of 
European integration. As Hay and Wincott point out, the integration project has come to 
affect national fiscal and social systems in various ways: ‘by constructing EU-level 
institutions, by regulating and in the process reshaping European states, and through 
economic as well as social policies’.87 Since the Member States have basically retained their 
right ‘to define the fundamental principles of their social security systems’,88 much attention 
has been given to the ‘open method of coordination’ as a form of ‘soft law’ or ‘new 
governance’, the aim of which is to bring about more convergence between Member State 
social policies.89 As Trubek and Trubek note, this project was spurred by ‘[t]he creation of a 
truly integrated market and a common currency [which] led to a new context for social 
policy, generating new constraints, creating new interdependencies [recte], and setting the 
stage for enhanced EU involvement’.90 So once again it all comes down to developments in 
the micro- and macroeconomic constitution. In this section, our guiding question is not how 
national social policies are coordinated by soft law in this specific policy field but how they 
are conditioned by hard law in other policy fields. 91 
 
While it would be worthwhile looking at how Member State social policies are restricted by 
the fiscal rules of the reformed monetary union in general, and by the conditionality of 
structural adjustment for Member States receiving financial assistance in particular,92 the 
three articles included in this section are concerned with the effects of internal market law, 
namely free movement rights, which have an impact on both the revenue and the expenditure 
side of national welfare regimes. The specific angle from which we analyse the role of free 
movement in furthering ‘welfare state interdependencies’93 is the transnationalisation of 
solidarity, which can be understood as either corrosive or constructive.94 Whereas the first 
                                                     
87 Hay and Wincott, above, n. 9, at 131 
88 Art. 153(4) TFEU. 
89 Trubek and Trubek, above, n. 6. 
90 Ibid., at 345. 
91 Hay and Wincott, above, n. 9, at 132-133. 
92 C. de la Porte and E. Heins (eds.), The Sovereign Debt Crisis, the EU and Welfare State Reform (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2016). 
93 Trubek and Trubek, above, n. 6, at 345. 
94 Undermining existing communities of solidarity or creating new networks of solidarity, de facto and de jure. 
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contribution to this section addresses the expansion of the free movement of capital and 
establishment, the other two contributions deal with the free movement of workers and 
persons. In both fields, free movement has an effect on the ‘constituency’ of national welfare 
states: not by exercising voting rights, but by entering or exiting their fiscal and social 
systems as (potential) taxpayers and beneficiaries. This entry/exit option goes to the heart of 
the social contract, which determines who owes what to whom in a national – or transnational 
– community of solidarity. 
 
[‘Economic Mobility and Fiscal Federalism: Taxation and European Responses in a 
Changing Constitutional Context’ (Jukka Snell and Jussi Jaakkola)] 
 
Snell and Jaakkola’s article reassesses the Europeanisation of the tax state through tax 
competition, on the one hand, and tax harmonisation, on the other. Whereas the former is 
furthered by the free movement of capital and the right of establishment,  the latter is a matter 
of political decision-making on the European level. As in other EU policy fields, negative 
integration (‘integration through the removal of tax obstacles’) is more advanced than 
positive integration (‘integration through tax harmonisation’).95 The question motivating this 
article is whether the EU can move from a state of fiscal interdependence, which erodes 
Member State capacity to tax, to a system of fiscal federalism, which would collectively 
restore it. This requires calibrating intergovernmental tax sovereignty with transnational tax 
solidarity. What Snell and Jaakkola find is that recent judicial, regulatory and political 
developments on the European level point in the right direction. The CJEU has become more 
accommodating with regard to the tax autonomy of Member States by revising its notions of 
restriction on economic freedoms and justifications of respective limitations. The 
Commission increasingly targets state aid investigations as harmful forms of tax competition. 
And new legislative initiatives are aimed at the harmonisation of corporate tax systems, the 
introduction of a tax on financial transactions, and tax-related information exchange. 
Moreover, it is argued that the enlargements of the EU in the 2000s and the Eurozone crisis in 
the 2010s have increased the legal possibilities as well as political willingness to engage in 
collective action in tax matters. 
 
                                                     
95 A. Menéndez, ‘Neumark Vindicated: The Three Patterns of Europeanisation of National Tax Systems and the 
Future of the Social and Democratic Rechtsstaat’, in D. Chalmers, M. Jachtenfuchs and C. Joerges (eds.) The 
End of the Eurocrats’ Dream: Adjusting to European Diversity (Cambridge University Press, 2016), 78-126. 
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[‘The Contentious Politics of Hospitality: Intra-EU Mobility and Social Rights’ (Maurizio 
Ferrera)] 
 
Ferrera’s article deals with problems related to the Europeanisation of the welfare state, 
starting from a ‘thick’ conception of solidarity, which supposes a high degree of social 
integration, unity and cohesion in a given social collective. As a prototype of highly 
‘organised’ or ‘institutionalised’ forms of solidarity, the national welfare state was premised 
on a balancing act between ‘opening’ and ‘closure’, that is, the generalisation of social 
security arrangements to a wider, national collective, and the avoidance of what Ferrera refers 
to as ‘redistributive stretching’: the overextension of solidarity claims beyond what seemed 
workable and acceptable at a given point in time. The question of membership, or who can 
join (national) social security schemes, is also key in the transnationalisation of solidarity. As 
opposed to cross-national solidarity, which refers to financial transfers or the pooling of 
resources between EU Member States, transnational solidarity refers to the relations between 
citizens: non-mobile national citizens and mobile EU citizens, and more precisely, to the 
willingness of the ones to share ‘their’ place and welfare arrangements with the others. 
Making a case for political realism, the article suggests taking the normative ambitions of EU 
citizenship down a notch for the time being. Instead of insisting on the legal and moral 
principle of non-discrimination against national populations which have become increasingly 
reluctant to admit foreigners, the suggestion is made to follow the principle of hospitality, 
which would give Member States more autonomy in defining access to national communities 
of solidarity. 
 
[‘From Resource to Burden: Rescaling Solidarity with Strangers in the Single Market’ (Suvi 
Sankari and Sabine Frerichs)] 
 
The article by Sankari and Frerichs takes a closer look at the form of solidarity implied by 
EU citizenship law, which is here framed as (transnational) solidarity with strangers. 
Solidarity with strangers refers to the opening up of national welfare systems to mobile EU 
citizens from other Member States. As a legally organised form of solidarity, it undergirds the 
free movement of workers and other ‘economically active’ persons and, to a lesser extent and 
subject to certain conditions, it also supports the mobility of other, ‘economically non-active’ 
persons, such as students, pensioners, or the unemployed. Drawing on a terminology 
originally used to qualify the development of social rights in national welfare states, the 
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evolution of EU citizenship law is reconstructed in terms of the ‘commodification’ or 
‘decommodification’ of European social rights. Whereas in the first phase of the integration 
process, transnational solidarity was confined to economically active EU citizens, it later 
came to be extended to certain groups of economically non-actives. In recent years, however, 
a process of ‘recommodification’ seems to be occurring in the sense that access to national 
welfare systems for economically actives and non-actives alike is becoming more conditional 
on fulfilment of (overt or covert) economic requirements. In a political climate aggravated by 
Brexit, even the social rights of mobile workers seem no longer exempt from re-evaluation in 
terms of whether they are justified by a sufficient ‘link of integration’ to the host society and 
whether potential benefit claims can be considered an ‘unreasonable burden’ on national 
welfare systems. 
 
 
V. Reformed monetary union: Transnationalisation of public debt 
 
Financial and monetary integration culminated in the Maastricht Treaty. This not only 
constitutionalised the free movement of capital, including its erga omnes extension with 
regard to third countries, but also established a fully-fledged monetary constitution for what 
has become the Eurozone, now consisting of 19 out of currently 28 (and after ‘Brexit’ 27) EU 
Member States. In sociological terms, the common currency has been pictured as a bond that 
unites96 as well as a bond that subjects.97 The former vision is premised on a continuation of 
welfare capitalism on the European level, with the Euro adopting the same ‘dual economic 
and political nature’ as national currencies,98 which had become a symbol of the ‘compromise 
between private economic players and the public political players’.99 Under these conditions, 
a common currency would indeed represent a ‘community of debt’100 which is not held 
together by economic, or commercial, debt only but also by ‘social debt’. In general terms, 
the latter can as much be understood as what we owe to society, on which we depend for our 
lives, as what the state owes to its citizens, e.g., civil, political, and social rights.101 In this 
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sense, ‘community of debt’ is, from a monetary perspective, but another term for the modern 
social contract as it developed in the course of the twentieth century.102 However, it is open to 
question whether the euro could develop the same unifying force identifying a (new) political 
community as its predecessors on the national level. 
 
Instead, critics point to the hegemonic logic of the common currency, which has been 
‘designed to serve the interests of large financial, industrial and commercial capital in Europe 
as well as the interests of the most powerful states within the European Monetary Union’.103 
A form in which this hierarchy appears is the division between creditor states and debtor 
states, which has increasingly become ‘institutionalised’ on the European level.104 The 
political logic of the common currency is linked to its economic logic, which is occasionally 
depicted in analogy to the idea and functioning of the gold standard.105 In its classic form, the 
gold standard was conceived as a ‘self-regulating mechanism of supplying credit’.106 This 
means that, ideally speaking, an imbalance of payments between two countries was settled by 
gold movements, which would affect the domestic credit supply. Under these conditions, 
maintaining gold parity was considered paramount.107 With the gold-dollar exchange 
standard of Bretton Woods, the link to gold became indirect for most participating currencies, 
and it was ultimately suspended also for the US dollar. Today, most currencies of the world 
are ‘fiduciary’ in that their value ultimately rests on a ‘promise to pay’ backed by the state’s 
taxation powers. Domestic credit supply is managed by central banks according to actual or 
projected demand for credit in the country. However, in the monetary union, the idea is, once 
again, that liberalised ‘capital markets would regulate trade deficits automatically’ and that 
‘lending could flow based only on credit risk’.108 This was to be guaranteed by the European 
Central Bank (ECB), whose ‘independence […] has a stronger legal foundation than the 
                                                     
102 Under the premise of welfare capitalism, this implies ‘that a central monetary system enjoys legitimacy only 
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independence of national central banks’.109 Yet, in the crisis, the ECB has arguably gone 
beyond its restricted monetary-policy mandate by making ample use of ‘non-standard’ 
measures to restore financial stability in the Eurozone.110 
 
This section focuses on the implications of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and 
the Eurozone crisis for debt relations between public actors, namely the Member States. In 
the history of public debt, the formalisation of debt relations was a crucial step in developing 
the impersonal ‘fiscal state’: What had been ‘personalized borrowing by rulers’111 came to be 
replaced by the ‘professionalization of public finances’ in a rational-bureaucratic 
organisation.112 However, despite the increase of impersonal debt relations, the assessment of 
sovereign creditworthiness may still be shaped by particular bonds, such as between certain 
banks and governments,113 and not by anonymous market forces only. A more specific trend 
is the ‘formalization of creditor-debtor state relations’, that is, the relations between creditor 
states (and not just private creditors) and debtor states, ‘around agreed institutional 
arrangements and rules of the game’.114 Such arrangements include the classic gold standard 
as well as the Bretton Woods currency system and now European monetary union. However, 
the formalisation of creditor-debtor state relations in international and European law, which 
gained momentum after the Second World War, does not necessarily mean that the power 
asymmetries between creditor and debtor states would be resolved and that problems arising 
from these debt relations would be addressed on equal terms.115 
 
As a ‘stateless currency devoid of a coherent sovereign power’,116 the euro seems particularly 
suited to accentuate the ‘laws of the market’.117 In this sense, albeit not linked to commodity 
money (like gold or silver), the common currency is relatively ‘commodified’, or what is the 
same, its conditions and functioning are depoliticised. The euro has to prove its value, or its 
credibility as a common currency (which includes the sovereign creditworthiness of the 
Member States of the Eurozone), first of all on international financial markets. Indeed, one of 
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the tasks of the legal framework of the monetary union is to further market discipline, which 
can be defined as ‘the mutual responsiveness of financial markets and sovereign 
borrowers’118 and in practice often results in ‘the private governance of public debt’119 by 
national banks, credit agencies, and institutional investors. From the very inception of the 
monetary union, generation of market discipline has not been left to the markets only. 
Instead, ‘market-induced discipline was complemented by institutional, Union-level 
means.’120 These disciplinary means crystallised in the Stability and Growth Pact, which was 
launched in 1997 and reformed several times, most recently during the crisis. Decision-
making within the present regime is characterised by a combination of ‘highly centralised 
supranational intervention […] with intergovernmental control of key political decisions’.121 
The first contribution to this section documents the institutionalisation of creditor-debtor state 
relations in the European monetary regime, including reinforced mechanisms of economic 
governance, which are meant to secure budget discipline. The second contribution provides 
an in-depth analysis of the ways in which crisis management by the ECB may not only have 
turned private debt into public debt but also substituted for the mutualisation of public debt in 
the form of hidden transfers. Both articles illuminate, from different angles, the question of 
who owes what to whom in today’s European community of debt. As the previous sections 
have shown, public debt relations are only the tip of the iceberg which ultimately rests on 
private debt relations. 
 
[‘The Institutional Implications of the Rise of a Debt-based Monetary Regime in Europe’ 
(Fernando Losada)] 
 
Losada’s article retraces the formalisation of creditor-debtor state relations in the European 
legal framework from the beginnings of the integration process until today. The article builds 
on the assumption that the Eurozone crisis made more explicit the ‘underlying patterns’ of 
these debt relations, which had influenced European politics even earlier.122 More generally, 
the focus is on external debt, that is, state liabilities to foreign creditors, be they private or 
public, which both have a role in the transnationalisation of public debt. The main claim is 
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that, in the (reformed) monetary union, power asymmetries between creditor and debtor states 
were translated into procedural rules and substantive norms, which override the principle of 
equality between Member States and challenge the cooperative nature of the integration 
process. The historical reconstruction starts from the founding treaties, which did not yet 
contain an agenda of financial and monetary integration, but relied for monetary stability on 
the Bretton Woods system, while capital mobility was still contained. With the end of Bretton 
Woods, the liberalisation of capital movements, and the emerging monetarist consensus, the 
external preconditions for the integration process changed. Power relations between 
international creditors and debtor states first became evident in the international monetary 
order before they came to shape the European monetary union as well. What can be observed 
since the beginning of the Eurozone crisis is an increasing codification of creditor interests. 
This may go at the expense not only of legitimate interests of debtor states but also of more 
collaborative ways of reducing macro-economic imbalances. 
 
[‘Has Euro Area Monetary Policy Become Redistribution by Monetary Means? 
“Unconventional” Monetary Policy as Hidden Transfer Mechanism’ (Klaus Tuori)] 
 
Tuori’s article analyses the management of the Eurozone crisis by the European system of 
central banks from a legal and economic perspective. The legal analysis is guided by the 
question whether the Eurosystem has exceeded its original mandate, which is confined to 
maintenance of price stability, and perhaps even compromised its stipulated independence by 
undertaking a variety of ‘unconventional’ monetary policy measures to contain the crisis. The 
economic analysis addresses the question whether these measures, which amounted to large-
scale interventions in the market mechanism of capital allocation (even though they were also 
meant to cure market failure and prevent the fragmentation of integrated capital markets), 
yielded significant distributive effects in the Eurozone. In this case, these unconventional 
policy measures could be depicted as a hidden transfer mechanism. Such ‘mutualisation of 
responsibilities by monetary means’ is documented for the refinancing operations of the 
Eurosystem, which provided liquidity to banks via the interbank market on unusually 
permissive conditions, as well as its government bond purchasing programmes, which 
improved the conditions for public borrowing in the market for debt securities. These 
interventions helped not only banks and government in debtor states but they also benefited 
(their) private creditors and investors, both at the expense of European taxpayers, who 
assume the accumulated risks. While these distributive effects have already materialised, 
 
 
26 
imbalances in the system for monetary payments and the issuance of banknotes between 
creditor and debtor states would only result in substantial losses in the case of a breakup of 
the Eurozone. 
 
 
VI. A tentative synthesis: Tying up the European community of debt 
 
Dyson’s monumental States, Debt, and Power not only aims to show how debt relations 
played an important role ‘in shaping the character of European states and the European 
integration process’,123 but also to demonstrate how the recent crisis only accentuated 
‘unresolved tensions between the old and new elements in European economic 
governance’:124 an intergovernmental logic of (largely informal) power relations between 
creditor and debtor states and a supranational logic of the formalisation of debt relations ‘on 
the basis of collective institutional structures to support banking, fiscal, and monetary 
union’.125 Similar to Dyson’s study, this special issue points to the moral underpinnings of 
(legal and economic) debt relations, or the question of what we owe to each other in the 
European polity of today.126 While Dyson’s book ‘seeks to make the case for a historically-
minded political economy’,127 this special issue takes the European community of debt as a 
starting point for a sociologically-minded study of debt relations, which turns to the law – 
namely European law – as an indicator of transnational solidarity, whose scope and limits 
remain an object of contestation. 
 
According to a classic argument that intrigues sociologists and lawyers alike, the rather 
abstract form of solidarity128 which characterises modern societies rests as much on legal 
rules as on economic exchange. More precisely, ‘material’ and ‘moral’ bonds reinforce each 
other.129 Solidarity may thus ‘grow’ with the division of labour. While this first was the case 
within national societies, which thus came to be unified, it can in principle also be assumed 
for a European society in the making. Ideally speaking, ‘solidarity among strangers’ would 
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thus only be taken one step further: extending it from the national to the European level.130 
However, the potential of a Europeanised solidarity to supplant the ‘organised’ solidarity of 
national welfare states is contested.131 To illustrate this, one may contrast the relative 
‘solidity’ of bonds based on national citizenship with the relative ‘fluidity’ of transnational 
bonds based on free movement rights.132 Moreover, a given degree of welfare state 
interdependence, or what one could term transnational solidarity de jure and de facto,133 
referring to the existing European legal framework and its actual economic effects, is not 
always reflected in a concomitant development of popular feelings of solidarity, or what one 
could term transnational solidarity de more, referring to public acceptance of these welfare 
entanglements.134 One reason for a lack of identification with the present form of 
Europeanised welfare capitalism may be that it is ‘imposed from above’ (EU law), but has to 
be ‘implemented from below’ (Member State administrations).135 
 
Different notions of solidarity are also pointed out in Dyson’s account of the Eurozone crisis 
and the ensuing debate about institutional reforms. Accordingly, creditor states (and, 
presumably, their populations) favour an understanding of ‘solidarity as rule compliance’, or 
a ‘solidarity of [individual] effort’ to meet stipulated macroeconomic requirements, as 
opposed to an understanding of ‘solidarity as fair burden-sharing’, or a ‘solidarity of 
collective financial assistance’ in the case of severe imbalances and crises.136 The former 
reading emphasises the domestic responsibilities of debtor states in averting crisis and 
undertaking reforms: ‘The post-2007 crises were represented as ‘home-grown’. They were 
the product of faulty financial and economic policies in debtor states that undermined their 
                                                     
130 Which means that already ‘the nation’ is not defined in ‘ethnic’ but in ‘civil’ terms; see J. Habermas, ‘Why 
Europe Needs A Constitution’, (2001) New Left Review 11 (September-October), 5-26, at 15-16. 
131 Frerichs, above, n. 29. 
132 ‘Fluidity’ is here used in the sense of flexibility, not fugitiveness. For the former interpretation, see Münch’s 
notion of transnational solidarity as a ‘network of mutually dependent parts that might be more or less densely 
woven and open to including new specialised parts’; Münch, above, n. 29, at 521. For the latter interpretation, 
see Somek’s notion of ‘fluid organic solidarity’; A. Somek, ‘Transnational Solidarity: Organic or Proletarian?’, 
available at: http://www.academia.edu/24546842/Transnational_Solidarity_Organic_or_Proletarian. 
133 Cf. A. Somek, ‘Solidarity Decomposed: Being and Time in European Citizenship’, (2007) 32 European Law 
Review, 787-818. 
134 For a comparative approach to measuring the moral economy in terms of public opinion, see S. Mau, The 
Moral Economy of Welfare States: Britain and Germany Compared (Routledge, 2003); cf. J. Gerhards and H. 
Lengfeld, European Citizenship and Social Integration in the European Union (Routledge, 2015). 
135 For a related argument, see H. Brunkhorst, Solidarity: From Civic Friendship to a Global Legal Community, 
translated by Jeffrey Flynn (MIT Press, 2005), at 172: ‘The citizens of Europe have their rights, but they did not 
give them to themselves. So the solidarity of European subjects remains asymmetrical, secured from above, and 
hierarchically structured.’ 
136 Dyson, above, n. 1, at 254 and 288.  
 
 
28 
competitiveness and/or that led to unsustainable credit booms.’137 The latter reading, in 
contrast, emphasises the international dimension of the crisis and the collective efforts needed 
to attain more balanced economies: ‘The post-2007 crises were represented as stemming from 
trade and financial imbalances, from reckless lending from creditor states, and from the lack 
of symmetrical adjustment by creditor states.’138 The implications of these different readings 
regarding the engagement of creditor states in risk- and burden-sharing are clearly 
different.139 
 
One could argue that speaking of a European ‘community of debt’ instead of a European 
‘community of credit’ lays more emphasis on the fault of debtor states than on the 
concomitant responsibilities of creditor states, and would thus leave little room for a more 
substantial understanding of solidarity.140 However, the conceptual framework of this special 
issue emphasises the distribution of rights and responsibilities in the institutionalised 
networks of exchange, reciprocity and redistribution that arise from, or are shaped by, the 
European economic constitution. Within that conceptual framework, the distinction between 
credit and debt as well as between debt and solidarity is encompassed by the broader notion 
of bonds of obligation between Member States, market participants, and European citizens. 
While the law regulating these relations serves as an indicator of a certain state of moral 
affairs, this also needs ‘unpacking’ as to who owes what to whom in a wider political-
economic and historical-cultural context. The different sections of this special issue bring 
different types of relations of debt and solidarity to the fore: in ‘integrated capital markets’, 
‘interdependent welfare states’, and the ‘reformed monetary union’. Studying the bonds of 
obligation in each of these spheres has a value in itself. However, to obtain a fuller picture of 
the European community of debt, the links between the different spheres are equally 
important. 
 
With regard to debt relations, more narrowly understood, this requires comparing and 
connecting the distribution of rights, risks, and responsibilities between creditors and debtors 
in corporate debt, consumer debt, and sovereign debt.141 With regard to communities of 
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solidarity, one could think of different organisational levels of redistribution: national, 
transnational,142 and supranational.143 Streeck distinguishes between Staatsvolk (state people) 
and Marktvolk (market people), which describes the different constituencies of the ‘debt 
state’: national citizens and voters on the one hand and international creditors and investors 
on the other.144 Against this backdrop, a ‘consolidation state’ is depicted as ‘one whose 
commercial market obligations take precedence over its political citizenship obligations’.145 
In short, given the transformation of welfare capitalism, communities of solidarity are 
conditioned by networks of debt. The national social or fiscal contract is undermined by 
market forces, which are embodied in the right to free movement of goods and services, but 
also of factors of production. 
 
In this special issue, the link between interdependent welfare states and integrated capital 
markets was specified as a move from public debt to private debt and, relatedly, from social 
citizenship to ‘financial citizenship’.146 In practice, this means a ‘privatisation’ of the social 
contract by trading off the rights of beneficiaries of the welfare state against the rights of 
consumers of financial services, and imposing more conditions on welfare recipients while 
giving more leeway to consumer debtors.147 As Domurath’s article shows, the adaptation of 
private law to the new paradigm of ‘financial inclusion’ is still incomplete. Another trade-off 
that results from free movement rights and the concomitant Europeanisation of welfare 
capitalism privileges ‘mobile’ over ‘immobile’ taxpayers and beneficiaries, which likewise 
amounts to a change in constituencies. Focusing on the tax side of the equation, Snell and 
Jaakkola suggest in their article that national tax sovereignty can be rescued, or upgraded, by 
means of supranational tax solidarity. As to the expenditure side, in their respective articles 
Ferrera and Sankari/Frerichs debate the potential and pitfalls of a Europeanised form of social 
citizenship which accommodates free movement rights at the expense of national welfare 
privileges. 
 
The link between integrated capital markets and the reformed monetary union has been 
highlighted in this introduction by showing the continuity of fiscal [recte: financial] and 
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monetary integration. But that link is also evident in the shift from private debt to public debt 
in the transformation of the global financial crisis into a European sovereign debt crisis. As 
Juutilainen’s article shows, the commodification and securitisation of debt, which helps 
creditors to manage the risks inherent in debt relations and which is an institutional 
precondition for the globalisation of capital markets, remains ambiguous in its social effects 
and may eventually cause systemic instabilities. The new watchword is ‘financial stability’, 
which is to be furthered by enhancing ‘micro-prudential’ as well as ‘macro-prudential’ 
financial regulation.148 As Tuori shows in his article, crisis management by the European 
system of central banks not only moved ‘bad risks’ from private creditors and investors to the 
Eurosystem and, hence, to European taxpayers, but also implied hidden transfers, or the 
mutualisation of risk, between creditor and debtor states. However, as Losada’s article makes 
clear, the institutionalisation of creditor-debtor state relations in the enhanced EMU takes 
place under strict conditions of consolidation and structural adjustment in debtor states, 
which, once more, brings to bear the rights of (international) creditors against (national) 
taxpayers. In this way, the reformed monetary union reinforces the logic of interdependent 
welfare states. 
 
What we are left with is an indicative picture of what the European community of debt means 
for the distribution of rights, risks, and responsibilities within and between its different 
constituencies. If the rights of consumer debtors are emphasised, this increases the 
responsibilities of their commercial creditors, but it may also serve to compensate for the loss 
of welfare rights. If risks are reallocated from the private to the public sector, this may help to 
avoid a financial meltdown, but it also means that commercial investors benefit at the 
expense of ordinary taxpayers. If European corporations or citizens make use of their free 
movement rights, this puts strains on Member States with relatively high taxes and relatively 
generous social benefits, which in turn may annoy national populations. If Eurozone Member 
States are rescued (or hindered) from sovereign default, creditor states incur greater risks and 
may expect debtor states to take greater responsibilities through reforms of taxes and social 
benefits, which may, again, give rise to popular protest. The ‘moral economy of debt’ in 
Europe cannot be summed up in one term, but requires study of how the law strikes a balance 
between public and private actors, creditor and debtor states, mobile and immobile citizens, 
investors and taxpayers, workers and consumers – and how this balance is readjusted over 
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time. As recent developments suggest, an emerging pro-debtor orientation with regard to 
consumer debtors can coincide with a persistent pro-creditor orientation with regard to 
sovereign debtors,149 or, in other words, a normalisation of private default may go along with 
a moralisation of public default. To understand such ‘double standards’, one has to 
understand the hidden links, which requires putting law in its context. 
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